There are instances in which the seller may know in advance the actual number of bidders, such as auctions where bidding is by invitation only. Even if this information is not known in advance, however, a contingent bidding procedure provides a relatively simple mechanism that permits each bidder to act as if he knew the actual number of rivals he faces. Under contingent bidding, each buyer submits a vector of bids, where each bid in the vector corresponds to a specific number of bidders. That is, each bidder submits one bid which will be in effect should there be n bidders, a second bid, which will be in effect should there be n + 1 bidders, and so on. Under this procedure, the n used in determining the actual bid corresponds to the total number of bidders actually submitting bid vectors. In this way the seller is able to gain any benefits from revealing the number of bidders, even though the actual number of bidders remains unknown prior to the auction.
This article reports the results of a series of laboratory experiments designed to examine the theory's predictions about market outcomes in a first-price, sealed-bid auction with independent private values and uncertainty regarding the number of bidders. We do this by comparing the revenue-raising properties of a contingent bidding procedure to those of a noncontingent procedure.2 Previous experimental studies of independent private-value auctions have shown that bidders' behavior is consistent with their being risk averse ( Consistent with these theoretical predictions, noncontingent bidding procedures raise more revenue for the seller than contingent bidding in our experiments. Furthermore, our examinations of individual bidding patterns, in terms of inequality restrictions on the relationship between contingent and noncontingent bids, show that (1) we can reject the hypothesis that the narrowly interpreted Nash equilibrium bidding theory underlying these theoretical predictions is satisfied, as fewer than 50% of all individual bids satisfy the strict inequality requirements of the theory, but (2) a majority of the deviations from these strict inequality requirements favor the revenue-raising predictions of the Nash model, and, in a large number of cases, involve marginal violations of the theory. When considered together, these results suggest that bidders are responsive to the economic forces underlying the Nash model, although they do not respond exactly as the theory predicts.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the experimental design and procedures. Theoretical predictions for both market revenue results and individual bids are characterized in Section 3. We report the experimental results in Section 4, and Section 5 summarizes and concludes the article.
Experimental design
* Subjects were recruited primarily from MBA classes at the University of Houston to participate in experimental sessions lasting approximately two hours each. In each experiment six subjects acted as bidders, competing for the right to buy a single item in each of a series of trading periods. Each period consisted of either two small (n = 3) markets or one single large (n = 6) market. 0 Contingent bidding. Each bidder was told that while he would know the resale value of the item assigned to him with certainty, he would not know, prior to bidding, the size of the market in which he was competing. He was told that it was equally likely that he would participate in a market of size n = 3 or a market of size n = 6. However, he would be allowed to submit two bids, one contingent on n = 3 and the other contingent on n = 6. It was explained that these contingent bids would allow him to bid as if he knew the actual number of bidders, since only that bid corresponding to the actual number of bidders would be used. After each of the bidders had submitted his vector of bids, the actual size of the market was determined randomly. Furthermore, if the event n = 3 occurred, the composition of the markets (i.e., which three subjects would be in each small market) was also randomly determined.4
After the size and composition of the markets were determined, the bids were opened and posted. If there were six bidders, the high bidder earned profits equal to the difference between his private resale value and his bid contingent on n = 6. If there were three bidders, the bidder who submitted the highest bid contingent on n = 3 in each small market earned profits equal to the difference between his private resale value and his bid contingent on n = 3. All other bidders earned zero profits.
Each subject was told that he was under no obligation to submit either two equal or two different contingent bids. 0 Comparing contingent with noncontingent bidding. After several periods of contingent bidding, simultaneous bidding under two procedures was introduced. Each subject was informed that while he would continue to submit two contingent bids (the contingent procedure), he would now also submit a single bid, which would be in effect regardless of the number of active bidders (the noncontingent procedure). The noncontingent bids were submitted after the contingent bids were accepted, but before they were opened.
Subjects were told that the high bidder (or bidders, if n was three) would earn profits under only one of the two bidding procedures, to be determined randomly by a coin flip after both sets of bids were accepted. Following the coin flip, market size and composition were determined as before, with a 50% chance of two markets of size n = 3 and a 50% chance of a single market of size n = 6. Subjects were told that they were under no obligation to submit the same or different bids under the two procedures.5 3 These experiments were conducted by hand. In each auction period, a subject would select a bag containing a set of resale values and then draw his resale value from among those in the bag. There were always more bags than auction periods, and more resale values than subjects in each bag. Also, a copy of the computer program used to generate the resale values was maintained, in case subjects wished to verify the random determination of the resale values.
' Market size and composition were determined by subjects drawing from a deck of cards, with one card for each possible market of size n = 3, and an equal number of cards for markets of size n = 6. In experiment 3 the composition of the small markets was predetermined and remained constant throughout the experiment. The deck of cards was adjusted accordingly.
5 This dual-market bidding procedure directly controls for between subject variability, as well as for differences resulting from variations in randomly drawn private values. It may appear that the dual-market bidding procedure introduces a portfolio effect, whereby the optimal bid under contingent bidding affects the optimal bid under noncontingent bidding, and vice versa. However, assuming expected utility maximization, and using a coin flip to randomly determine in which market to pay, this is not the case. Further, Battalio, Kogut and Meyer (forthcoming) and Kagel, Harstad and Levin ( 1987) report no systematic behavioral differences under dual-market as compared to single-market procedures.
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Bidding continued in this manner for at least thirteen trading periods. Each period, after the bids were opened, all bids and corresponding private values for the markets in which profits were paid were posted on the blackboard. At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid their earnings plus a $4.00 participation fee in cash. They show that with risk aversion, the symmetric Nash equilibrium bids will be greater than that given by (1). With or without risk aversion, the assumption of symmetry implies that the highest bid will be submitted by the bidder who has the highest private value so that the auctions are Pareto efficient. E3 Noncontingent bidding. Ortega-Reichart (1968) was the first to relax the assumption that n is known. McAfee and McMillan ( 1987b) show that if buyers have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), then at the symmetric Nash equilibrium, the expected revenue to the seller is greater if the actual number of bidders is concealed than if it is revealed. They model the number of bidders as an unknown random variable with a known exogenous probability distribution; each bidder was assumed to have the same ex ante belief about the probability of a given number of bidders, p,. Matthews ( 1987) 
Theory

extends the results of McAfee and McMillan to show that if buyers have decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), then the expected revenue to the seller is also greater if the actual number of bidders is concealed.7
The intuition underlying the revenue predictions is as follows: McAfee and McMillan show that CARA buyers do not care whether the number of bidders is concealed or revealed, while Matthews shows that DARA buyers prefer that the number of bidders be revealed. Under contingent bidding (i.e., revelation of the number of bidders) there is an element of uncertainty which is absent under noncontingent bidding. If he wins the auction under contingent bidding, a bidder does not know the price he will pay, since he submitted a vector of bids. Under noncontingent bidding, however, a bidder knows with certainty the price he will pay if he wins, since only a single bid was submitted. If a risk-averse bidder is indifferent between the two bidding procedures (the case of CARA)-in one of which the price he will pay if he wins is a random variable, while in the other it is known with certainty-then the expected payment (i.e., seller's revenues) must be greater under the procedure which lacks the interim uncertainty (i.e., the noncontingent procedure). The same intuition applies for DARA buyers. If a risk-averse bidder prefers a procedure in which the price he will pay if he wins is a random variable, to one in which it is not, then the expected payment must be greater under the procedure in which payment is not a random variable.
Ortega-Reichart (1968) and Harstad, Levin and Kagel (1986) explicitly derive the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium bid function with numbers uncertainty for risk-neutral bidders: 
Experimental results
* Figure 1 provides data for market outcomes, under contingent bidding, for those periods with bidding under both contingent and noncontingent procedures. For each period the difference between the high (winning) bid and the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) bid for the high bidder in both the n = 3 and n = 6 contingent markets is shown.9 The high bid consistently lies above the RNNE prediction. Moreover, in all three experiments and in all periods, the difference between the high bid and the RNNE bid is substantially larger in the market with fewer bidders. This empirical regularity is consistent with some types of risk-averse bidding. For example, in our design 9All bids are included in our analysis regardless of the market in which profits were actually paid. In each auction period the difference between the high bid and the RNNE bid of the high bidder contingent on n = 3 is computed by averaging these differences for all possible permutations of three out of six bidders for that auction period. Thus, our results are independent of the particular subsets of three bidders realized in cases where we paid off in the two contingent markets of size n = 3, and do not depend on an arbitrary allocation of the six subjects into two groups of three in cases where we paid off in the market of size n = 6. Table 1 provides summary statistics of the market outcomes for both the contingent and noncontingent markets. The difference between the high bid and the RNNE bid is calculated for n = 3 and n = 6 under the contingent procedure. For the noncontingent procedure, we report the difference between the actual bid and the RNNE bid for the highest of the six bidders. In all cases the average actual bid price (high bid) exceeds the RNNE prediction and is significantly different from zero at the 5% level or better. Bidding in excess of the RNNE bid is consistent with risk aversion, which is a necessary condition for the noncontingent bidding procedure to raise more revenue.'0 Revenue comparisons under the contingent and noncontingent bidding procedures are presented in Table 2 .11 In all three experiments average revenue was greater under the noncontingent procedure, as predicted for CARA or DARA buyers. In experiments 1 and 3 the revenue difference is significantly different from zero at better than the 1% level. 10 In over 80% of the auctions the highest bid was submitted by the holder of the highest private resale value, as predicted by all symmetric Nash equilibria. This result is robust both across procedures and across numbers of bidders within the contingent procedure. The frequency of Pareto-efficient outcomes is comparable to that reported in other private-value auction experiments (Cox, Roberson and Smith, 1982; Kagel, Harstad and Levin, 1987) .
" Under contingent bidding, revenue for an auction period is calculated on the basis of the simple average of the price in the contingent market with n = 3 (where, as in footnote 9, this price is calculated as the average contingent on n = 3 for each possible permutation of three out of six bidders) and the contingent market with n = 6. For the noncontingent market, we computed an average price for markets of size n = 3 using the same procedure as in the contingent market, and took the simple average of this number and the price with n = 6. Averaged across all three experiments, the noncontingent procedure raised prices $0.31 more than the contingent procedure, which is significantly different from zero at better than the 1% level. Table 3 shows the frequency with which the noncontingent procedure raised more revenue. Combined across all experiments, the noncontingent procedure yields a higher average price in 43 out of 52 auction periods. Higher revenue under the noncontingent procedure is clearly not the result of a few outlying observations, but the result of consistently higher bidding with numbers uncertainty rather than without. Table 4 checks for the consistency of individual bids relative to the predictions of the theory. Part A of Table 4 shows the relationship between the two contingent bids. Bidders consistently responded in the "right" direction to the strategic forces involved in changing the number of bidders: 73.7% of all contingent bids satisfy the strict inequality b3(x) < b6(x). For 2.9% of the bids, b3(x) > b6(x) -an outright bidding error relative to the Nash equilibrium for which there is no rationalization. In the remaining 23.4% of the observations, the two contingent bids are equal. One possible reason for this is that bidders may not always take the time and effort to carefully calibrate their bids in cases where their private values are so low that they have little chance of winning the auction (Cox, Smith and Walker, 1987; Kagel, Harstad and Levin, 1987) . Repeating the same bid is a low-cost way of complying with the experimenters' requirements for submitting contingent bids. To test for this, we repeated the analysis using only private resale values greater than $10.00. In this case, 11.7% of all contingent bids were equal, while the bidding error (b3(x) > b6(x)) rate remains virtually the same, 2.8%. Part B of Table 4 shows noncontingent bids relative to contingent bids for those cases in which b3(x) < b6(x). Of the 230 observations, 33.9% satisfy the complete inequality requirements of the theory as embodied in equation ( Restricting the analysis in Table 4B to those resale values in excess of $10.00 has virtually no effect on these results. Furthermore, of the 73 observations for which bids in the two contingent markets were equal, 95% of the time the noncontingent bid was equal to the two contingent bids as well.
Summary and conclusions
* We conducted a series of first-price, sealed-bid auction experiments in which a single indivisible commodity was auctioned off among buyers with independent private values when there was uncertainty about the number of competing bidders. The actual number of bidders was an exogenously determined random variable with a 50% chance of being either three or six. Revenue-raising properties of a noncontingent bidding procedure (numbers uncertainty not resolved) were compared with those of a contingent bidding procedure (numbers uncertainty resolved).
Looking at individual bids in the contingent markets shows that bidders are sensitive to the most elementary strategic considerations in the auctions, as the Nash equilibrium bidding model predicts the ordering of the overwhelming majority of individual bids (particularly when we restrict our attention to those bids with higher probabilities of winning) .12 While the revenue predictions with respect to contingent versus noncontingent These results suggest that the basic economic forces underlying the revenue predictions of McAfee and McMillan, as well as Matthews, are at work in these auctions. When we take into account that there are subjective transactions costs associated with making bids and that bidders are rarely observed making detailed calculations, the fact that a large majority of the individual observations satisfies the revenue-raising requirements of the theory, in conjunction with the increase in revenue under noncontingent bidding, provides evidence that the forces specified in the theory were at work. Furthermore, given that the assumption of strict symmetry is violated (somewhat under 20% of all auctions were won by someone other than the highest private value holder; see footnote 10), and the fact that a number of bidders with low resale values did not find it worthwhile to adjust their bids contingent on n, it is clearly too much to expect that point predictions of auction models will be exactly satisfied.
From a broader perspective, our results serve to reinforce the impression that, by and large, Nash equilibrium bidding theory, with some accounting for risk aversion, serves to do a reasonably good job of predicting laboratory market behavior in private-value auction experiments ( 
